PRINCIPAL RESEARCH ECONOMIST - ADDITIONALITY AND DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ASSESSMENT (ADOA)
Reference: ADB/17/236
Location: Côte d’Ivoire
Grade: PL4
Position N°: 50069153
THE COMPLEX
The
Chief Economist/Vice-President for Economic Governance and Knowledge
Management is the Bank’s spokesperson on economic matters and the Vice
Presidence for the ‘Economics Governance and Knowledge Management
Complex’.
The Vice-President for Economic Governance and Knowledge
Management is responsible for (i) providing leadership and visibility
for the Bank on economic, finance, financial governance and socio
economic development issues; and coordinate the generation of analytical
works to inform operational policy; (ii) systematically emphasize the
critical role of knowledge, experience, lessons learnt and their
tangible impact on sustainable, inclusive transformation of African
economies.
The Vice-President for Economic Governance and Knowledge
Management will inspire, generate and provide direct support to the
President and Senior Management of the Bank on a broad range of
technical and management issues within the broad remit of economic,
finance, public financial governance, management and social economics.
THE HIRING DEPARTMENT / DIVISION
The Macroeconomics Policy, Forecasting And Research Department is dedicated to the generation of high quality
knowledge in the area of development in Africa. It provides technical
support to operations and regional member countries through rigorous
analytical work; engages in impactful policy dialogue with
decision-making bodies within and outside of the Bank; and most
importantly enhance the operational effectiveness of the Bank in
achieving the High 5s.
The activities of the department are
structured around the Macroeconomic Policy, Debt Sustainability and
Forecasting on one side, and the Microeconomics, Institutional and
Development Impact on the other.
The Microeconomic, Institutional and
Development Impact Division focuses on microeconomic issues related to
development finance, infrastructure development, private sector
development, industrial organizations, governance, competitiveness &
investment climate, agriculture, institutions, and regional integration
to support the High 5s.
In addition, the Microeconomic,
Institutional and Development Impact Division is the institutional
anchor of the ex-ante Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment
and Impact Evaluation of the Bank’s operations, as such it is a key
element of the Bank Results Framework and the primary tool for mainstreaming Development Outcomes.
THE POSITION
Principal
Research Economist ADOA-PUBLIC, as part of the Additionality and
Development Outcome Assessment team will contribute to the Additionality
and Development Outcome Assessment work both through assessing and
rating public sector operations (PUB) as well as producing analytical
work and research to inform operations, management and Bank clients in
Regional Member Countries.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Under
the general supervision of Division manager of the Microeconomic,
Institutional and Development Impact Division, the Principal Research
Economist ADOA - Public will:
Undertake Ex-ante Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment of Bank’s public sector operations:
Conduct
ex-ante Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment of the African
Development Bank Public Sector Operations, Regional Operations, and any
other type of operation as required by the management.
Review other team members’ ADOA notes and supervise the work of junior staff.
Carry
out any revisions to the ADOA framework for public sector operations on
the basis of implementation experience and lessons from other
Development Finance institutions.
Conduct research in the areas
supporting the Bank’s High 5s (High priority areas: Light Up and Power
Africa (Energy), Feed Africa (Agriculture and Nutrition), Industrialize
Africa (Industrialization), Integrate Africa (Regional Integration) and
Improve quality of live for Africans (Sustainable socio-economic
development)). This includes also strengthening knowledge generation in
the area of inclusive and green growth.
Provide inputs into the production of the Bank’s flagship publications:
Contribute
to the preparation of the report or assigned section, write the
sections and follow it (peer review until the publication.
Disseminate the findings of reports.
Provide technical and analytical inputs into the work of Operations Complexes:
Provide input into Country Strategy Papers.
Participate in Economic Sector Works.
Participate
in the peer-review process of project, program, policy documents,
including documents submitted to the Operations Committee.
Contribute knowledge in the Bank’s “Working Papers Series " and the Bank’s "African Development Review":
Publish research papers and review submitted articles to the African Development Review and Working Paper Series.
Contribute
to collaborative research and knowledge management activities carried
out jointly with regional and international organizations, research and
capacity building institutions in Africa, development research centers
and universities.
Review operation documents and participate in review meetings.
Perform other duties as may be assigned by the Manager
SELECTION CRITERIA
Including desirable skills, knowledge and experience:
At least a PHD Degree in Economics, Public Finance, or related discipline.
A
minimum of six (6) years of experience in development policy research
and analysis of economic issues related to finance, infrastructure
development, private sector development, industrial organizations,
governance & institutions, agriculture, competitiveness &
investment climate, and regional integration, Public Private
Partnerships or sector operations.
Publication record in
international peer reviewed journals or proven record of publications of
reports, working papers, books focusing on public finance management,
sovereign operations financing or issues related to development finance,
infrastructure development, industrial organizations, governance,
competitiveness & investment climate, agriculture, institutions, and
regional integration.
Very Good knowledge and background in the use
of statistical and econometric methods and packages in project
evaluation, public finance and development economics research.
Proven
ability in development policy research and analysis of economic
conditions that are of relevance for the High 5s (Bank priority areas).
Ability to design and conduct research projects/programs with limited supervision
Proven skills in drafting and preparation of policy memoranda, speeches and notes for use in decision making processes.
Communicate and write effectively in French or English, with a good working knowledge of the other language.
Competence in the use of leading econometrics software packages and in Microsoft Suites (Word, PowerPoint, Excel and Access).
CHIEF SECURITY OPERATIONS OFFICER
Reference: ADB/17/232
Location: Côte d’Ivoire
Grade: PL3
Position N°: 50093577
THE COMPLEX
The
President, plans, supervises and manages the business of the Bank
Group. Under the direction of the Boards of Directors, the President
conducts the business of the Bank and the African Development Fund and
manages operations and activities in accordance with the Agreements
establishing the African Development Bank and the African Development
Fund.
The President supervises several Departments and Units
including Office of the President; Independent Development Evaluation
Department; Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department; Compliance Review
and Mediation Unit; Secretariat to the Sanctions Appeals Board;
Administrative Tribunal; Office of the Auditor General; Group Risk
Management Directorate; General Counsel and Legal Services Department;
Communication and External Relations Department; Staff Integrity and
Ethics Office and Office of the Secretary General & General
Secretariat.
The Hiring Department
The African Development
Bank’s Security Unit is a robust security function reporting to the
President of the Bank. Deep global analytical capabilities combined with
Africa wide security processes are in place in order to provide the
full spectrum of security services to the Bank.
Security Unit
detects, deters and reacts to a broad range of risks spanning the
security spectrum; physical; political, information and reputational
risks around the globe are monitored closely to address the changing
security dynamic.
Our security requirements include risk analysis,
training, coordination with outside actors and implementation of
security programs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
THE POSITION
The
main purpose of this job is to support the Bank operations in ensuring
that effective security measures for the country Offices programs are
both appropriately planned for and addressed within International,
regional and national contexts.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Under the supervision and guidance of the Head Of Security Unit, the Chief Security Operations Officer will:
Management:
Provide
guidance to the Head of Security on conceptual strategy development and
management of the Global Security Operation Centre.
Define policies
and operational procedures for the Global Security Operations Center in
support of the Bank’s business strategy and direction.
Identify
current and potential legal and regulatory issues affecting security,
assess their impact on the Bank, and submit recommendations to the Head
Security.
Plans and oversees the management of activities undertaken
by Centre; ensures that substantive work programmes and programmed
activities are carried out in a timely manner, coordinating specific
projects in the Centre, and, in liaison with Regional Resources Centre’s
or other stakeholders.
Ensure that the output produced by the Global
Security Operations Center maintains high-quality standards; that
reports are clear, objective and based on factual data.
Foster
teamwork and communication among staff in the Global Security Operations
Center and other Regional Communication and Operation Centres
The
Chief Security Operations Officer is responsible for the Global Security
Operations Center facilitation of crisis management and support to
affected parties when crisis management procedures are activated.
SENIOR RESEARCH ECONOMIST (IMPACT EVALUATION)
Reference: ADB/17/237
Location: Côte d’Ivoire
Grade: PL5
Position N°: 50093677
THE COMPLEX
The
Chief Economist/Vice-President for Economic Governance and Knowledge
Management is the Bank’s spokesperson on economic matters and the Vice
President for the ‘Economics Governance and Knowledge Management
Complex’.
The Chief Economist/Vice-President for Economic Governance
and Knowledge Management is responsible for (i) providing leadership and
visibility for the Bank on economic, finance, financial governance and
socio economic development issues; and coordinate the generation of
analytical works to inform operational policy; (ii) systematically
emphasize the critical role of knowledge, experience, lessons learnt and
their tangible impact on sustainable, inclusive transformation of
African economies.
The Chief Economist/Vice-President for Economic
Governance and Knowledge Management will inspire, generate and provide
direct support to the President and Senior Management of the Bank on a
broad range of technical and management issues within the broad remit of
economic, finance, public financial governance, management and social
economics.
THE HIRING DEPARTMENT / DIVISION
The Macroeconomics
Policy, Forecasting And Research Department is dedicated to the
generation of high quality knowledge in the area of development in
Africa. It provides technical support to operations and regional member
countries through rigorous analytical work; engages in impactful policy
dialogue with decision-making bodies within and outside of the Bank; and
most importantly enhance the operational effectiveness of the Bank in
achieving the High 5s.
The activities of the department are
structured around the Macroeconomic Policy, Debt Sustainability and
Forecasting on one side, and the Microeconomics, Institutional and
Development Impact on the other.
The Microeconomic, Institutional and
Development Impact Division focuses on microeconomic issues related to
development finance, infrastructure development, private sector
development, industrial organizations, governance, competitiveness &
investment climate, agriculture, institutions, and regional integration
to support the High 5s.
In addition, the Microeconomic,
Institutional and Development Impact Division is the institutional
anchor of the ex-ante Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment
and Impact Evaluation of the Bank’s operations, as such it is a key
element of the Bank Results Framework and the primary tool for
mainstreaming Development Outcomes.
THE POSITION
The
Senior Research Economist-Impact Evaluation is part of Impact
Evaluation team and specifically contribute in developing an Impact
Evaluation culture and contribute to Impact Evaluation exercises and
research work:
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Under
the general supervision of the Division Manager of the Microeconomic,
Institutional and Development Impact Division, the Senior Research
Economist will:
Contribute to Impact Evaluation exercises on Bank
operations and provide input in other team members’ Impact Evaluation
work in the Division.
Contribute in research activities in the areas
supporting the Bank’s High five (5’s) priority areas: Light Up and Power
Africa (Energy), Feed Africa (Agriculture and Nutrition), Industrialize
Africa (Industrialization), Integrate Africa (Regional Integration) and
Improve quality of live for Africans (Sustainable socio-economic
development)).
Provide inputs into the production of the Bank’s flagship publications:
Contribute
to the preparation of the report or assigned section, writing assigned
sections and follow it (peer reviews) until the publication.
Disseminate the findings of reports.
Provide technical and analytical inputs into the work of Operations Complexes:
Provide input into Country Strategy Papers .
Participate in Economic Sector Works .
Participate
in the peer review process of project, program, policy documents,
including documents submitted to the Operations Committee.
Contribute to Bank Economic Intelligence documents:
Provide economic intelligence (statement, policy briefs) to Senior Management on economic development issues.
Contribute knowledge in the Bank’s “Working Papers Series " and the Bank’s "African Development Review":
Publish research papers and review submitted articles to the African Development Review and Working Paper Series.
Participate
in collaborative research and knowledge management activities carried
out jointly with regional and international organizations, research and
capacity building institutions in Africa, development research centers
and universities.
Review operation documents and participate in review meetings.
Perform other duties as may be assigned by the Supervisor or Management.
SELECTION CRITERIA
Including desirable skills, knowledge and experience:
Have at least a Ph.D. in Economics or related Social Sciences;
Have
a minimum of five (5) years’ experience in Impact Evaluation of
operations or Experimental Economics in the High 5s areas including the
following: infrastructure including energy, agriculture, private sector
development, industrial organizations and social sectors, project
analysis and/or monitoring and evaluation.
Publication record in international peer reviewed journals, working papers, book chapters, reports, etc.
Good
knowledge and background in the use of statistical and econometric
methods and packages in project evaluation, finance and development
economics research;
Proven ability in development policy research and
analysis of economic conditions that are of relevance for the High 5s
(Bank priority areas).
Ability to design and conduct research projects/programs
Proven skills in drafting and preparation of policy memoranda, speeches and notes for use in decision making processes.
Communicate and write effectively in French or English, with a good working knowledge of the other language;
Competence in the use of leading econometrics software packages and in Microsoft Suites (Word, PowerPoint, Excel and Access).
CHIEF REGIONAL SECURITY & SAFETY OFFICER
Reference: ADB/17/233
Location: West Africa
Grade: PL3
Position N°: 50093768/50093770/50093771
THE COMPLEX
The President, plans, supervises and manages the business of the Bank Group.
Under
the direction of the Boards of Directors, the President conducts the
business of the Bank and the African Development Fund and manages
operations and activities in accordance with the Agreements establishing
the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund.
The
President supervises several Departments and Units including Office of
the President; Independent Development Evaluation Department; Integrity
and Anti-Corruption Department; Compliance Review and Mediation Unit;
Secretariat to the Sanctions Appeals Board; Administrative Tribunal;
Office of the Auditor General; Group Risk Management Directorate;
General Counsel and Legal Services Department; Communication and
External Relations Department; Staff Integrity and Ethics Office and
Office of the Secretary General & General Secretariat.
THE HIRING DEPARTMENT/DIVISION
The African Development Bank’s Security Unit is a robust security function reporting to the President of the Bank.
Deep
global analytical capabilities combined with Africa wide security
processes are in place in order to provide the full spectrum of security
services to the Bank.
Security Unit detects, deters and reacts to a
broad range of risks spanning the security spectrum; physical;
political, information and reputational risks around the globe are
monitored closely to address the changing security dynamic.
Our
security requirements include risk analysis, training, coordination with
outside actors and implementation of security programs at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels.
THE POSITION
The
Chief Regional Security & Safety Officer will be responsible for
leading the delivery of security and safety services to the region.
The
incumbent will provide expertise and specialized support on all aspects
of security and safety in the region based on International Standards
and Bank Guidelines.
SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICER
Reference: ADB/17/238
Location: Côte d’Ivoire
Grade: PL5
Position N°: 50000555
THE COMPLEX
The
Vice-Presidency, Human Resources and Corporate Services Complex ensures
the delivery of efficient, people-centered, client-oriented, corporate
services to ensure overall institutional effectiveness in all aspects of
the Bank’s corporate services.
The Complex leads efforts to ensure
the competitiveness of the Bank as the employer of choice and is
responsible for providing leadership in the formulation and
implementation of Bank’s strategies on people, IT, general services and
institutional procurements, language services, business continuity, and
health and safety strategies.
THE HIRING DEPARTMENT
The
Corporate Information Technology Services Department’s mission at the
Bank is to align the IT delivery strategy along with the Bank’s business
strategy to increase the organizational effectiveness through efficient
use of the Information Systems.
Under the leadership of the African
Development Bank’s Information Systems Director, the Information
Technology Systems Department is mandated by the Bank to deliver best
possible IT services for Bank Staff, and help achieve the results that
gets the Bank closer to accomplishing its poverty reduction goals in
Africa.
THE POSITION
The Senior Program
Management Officer will be responsible for initiating, managing and
effectively governing the day-to-day delivery aspects of a selected
business project.
The role is to structure and deliver one or more
major change projects in a controlled manner. The initiatives are
wide-ranging through the operational cycle of the business, delivering a
cohesive business/Information Technology solution which meets business
requirements.
CLICK HERE TO APPLY
LAST DATE: JUNE 15TH 2017
Tuesday, May 30, 2017
Monday, May 29, 2017
NIGERIA IMMIGRATION RECRUITMENT 2017
NIGERIA IMMIGRATION RECRUITMENT 2017
apply immigration by clicking here www.nisrecruitment.org.ng
General Information
- This is to notify candidates and the General Public that www.nisrecruitment.org.ng is the official Nigerian Immigration Service URL that links to the Recruitment and Enlistment Portal. Any website or portal apart from this portal is considered a SCAM. Any candidate who visits any other website does it at his/her own RISK
- THIS ONLINE APPLICATION IS FREE
- Online Registration starts on ......
General Requirement for Recruitment
- Applicant must be Nigerian by birth.
- Applicants must be medically fit and present certificate of medical fitness from a government hospital.
- Applicant must be of good character and must not have been convicted of a criminal offence and must not be a member of a secret society/cult.
- Applicant must be free from financial embarrassment.
- Applicant must be between the ages of 18-30 years.
- Applicant's height must not be less than 1.65m for males and 1.60m for females.
- Applicant's chest measurement of not less than 0.87m for men.
Please Note:
- Any certificate or qualification not declared or tendered and accepted at recruitment centre shall not be acceptable after recruitment exercise.
- A duly completed and signed guarantor's section of the application form to be presented for screening, which is to be signed by officers not below the rank of Chief superintendent of Immigration (CSI) or its equivalents in the sister organization.
General Information
- This is to notify candidates and the General Public that www.nisrecruitment.org.ng is the official Nigerian Immigration Service URL that links to the Recruitment and Enlistment Portal. Any website or portal apart from this portal is considered a SCAM. Any candidate who visits any other website does it at his/her own RISK
- THIS ONLINE APPLICATION IS FREE
- Online Registration starts on ......
General Requirement for Recruitment
- Applicant must be Nigerian by birth.
- Applicants must be medically fit and present certificate of medical fitness from a government hospital.
- Applicant must be of good character and must not have been convicted of a criminal offence and must not be a member of a secret society/cult.
- Applicant must be free from financial embarrassment.
- Applicant must be between the ages of 18-30 years.
- Applicant's height must not be less than 1.65m for males and 1.60m for females.
- Applicant's chest measurement of not less than 0.87m for men.
Please Note:
- Any certificate or qualification not declared or tendered and accepted at recruitment centre shall not be acceptable after recruitment exercise.
- A duly completed and signed guarantor's section of the application form to be presented for screening, which is to be signed by officers not below the rank of Chief superintendent of Immigration (CSI) or its equivalents in the sister organization.
http://nisrecruitment.org.ng/
Thursday, March 16, 2017
Monday, November 7, 2016
the Conflict in the Niger Delta
The Conflict in the Niger Delta
From 2004 on, violence also hit the oil industry with piracy and kidnappings. In 2009, a presidential amnesty program accompanied with support and training of ex-militants proved to be a success. Thus until 2011, victims of crimes were fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of a failure to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses.[4]
Background
igeria, after nearly four decades of oil production, had by the early 1980s become almost completely economically dependent on petroleum extraction, which generated 25% of its GDPC. This has since risen to 60%, as of 2008. Despite the vast wealth created by petroleum, the benefits have been slow to trickle down to the majority of the population, who since the 1960s have increasingly been forced to abandon their traditional agricultural practices. Annual production of both cash and food crops dropped significantly in the later decades of 20th century, cocoa production dropped by 43%; Nigeria was the world's largest cocoa exporter in 1960. Rubber production dropped by 29%, cotton by 65%, and groundnuts by 64%.[5] While many skilled, well-paid Nigerians have been employed by oil corporations, the majority of Nigerians and most especially the people of the Niger Delta states and the far north have become poorer since the 1960s.[6]The Delta region has a steadily growing population estimated at more than 30 million people as of 2005, accounting for more than 23% of Nigeria's total population. The population density is also among the highest in the world, with 265 people per square kilometre, according to the Niger Delta Development Commission. This population is expanding at a rapid 3% per year and the oil capital, Port Harcourt, and other large towns are growing quickly. Poverty and urbanization in Nigeria are growing, and official corruption is considered a fact of life. The resulting scenario is one in which there is urbanization but no accompanying economic growth to provide jobs. This has led to a section of the growing populace assisting in destroying the ecosystem that they require to sustain themselves.[5]
Ogoniland
See also: Movement for the Survival
of the Ogoni People and Ken
Saro-Wiwa
Ogoniland
is a 404-square-mile (1,050 km2) region in the southeast of the
Niger
Delta basin. Economically viable petroleum
was discovered in Ogoniland in 1957, just one year after the discovery of Nigeria's first
commercial petroleum deposit, with Royal
Dutch Shell and Chevron Corporation setting up shop throughout
the next two decades. The Ogoni people, a minority ethnic group of about half a
million people who call Ogoniland home, and other ethnic groups in the region
attest that during this time, the government began forcing them to abandon
their land to oil companies without consultation, offering negligible
compensation. A 1979 constitutional amendment afforded the federal government
full ownership and rights to all Nigerian territory and also declared that all
compensation for land would "be based on the value of the crops on the
land at the time of its acquisition, not on the value of the land itself."
The Nigerian government could now distribute the
land to oil companies as it deemed fit.[7]The 1970s and 1980s saw empty government promises of benefits for the Niger Delta peoples fall through, with the Ogoni growing increasingly dissatisfied and their environmental, social, and economic apparatus rapidly deteriorating. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992. MOSOP, spearheaded by Ogoni playwright and author Ken Saro-Wiwa, became the major campaigning organization representing the Ogoni people in their struggle for ethnic and environmental rights. Its primary targets, and at times adversaries, have been the Nigerian government and Royal Dutch Shell.
Ogoni Flag created by Ken
Saro-Wiwa
Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between the Ogoni and the oil
companies escalated to a level of greater seriousness and intensity on both
sides. Both parties began carrying out acts of violence and MOSOP issued an
ultimatum to the oil companies (Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation) which demanded some $10 billion in accumulated royalties,
damages and compensation, and "immediate stoppage of environmental
degradation", as well as negotiations for mutual agreement on all future
drilling.[8]The Ogonis threatened mass action to disrupt operations if the companies failed to comply, shifting the focus of their actions from an unresponsive federal government to the oil companies engaged in the region. The rationale for this assignment of responsibility was the benefits accrued by the oil companies from extracting the natural wealth of the Ogoni homeland, and the neglect of the central government.
The government responded by banning public gatherings and declaring that disturbances of oil production were acts of treason. Oil extraction from the territory slowed to a trickle of 10,000 barrels per day (1,600 m3/d) (.5% of the national total).
Military repression escalated in May 1994. On May 21, soldiers and mobile policemen appeared in most Ogoni villages. On that day, four Ogoni chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally murdered. Saro-Wiwa, head of the opposing faction, had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, but he was detained in connection with the killings. The occupying forces, led by Major Paul Okuntimo of Rivers State Internal Security, claimed to be 'searching for those directly responsible for the killings of the four Ogonis.' However, witnesses say that they engaged in terror operations against the general Ogoni population. Amnesty International characterized the policy as deliberate terrorism. By mid-June, the security forces had razed 30 villages, detained 600 people and killed at least 40. This figure eventually rose to 2,000 civilian deaths and the displacement of around 100,000 internal refugees.[9][10]
In May 1994, nine activists from the movement who would become known as 'The Ogoni Nine', among them Ken Saro-Wiwa, were arrested and accused of incitement to murder following the deaths of four Ogoni elders. Saro-Wiwa and his comrades denied the charges, but were imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially convened tribunal, hand-selected by General Sani Abacha, on 10 November 1995. The activists were denied due process and upon being found guilty, were hanged by the Nigerian state.[11]
The executions were met with an immediate international response. The trial was widely criticised by human rights organisations and the governments of other states, who condemned the Nigerian government's long history of detaining its critics, mainly pro-democracy and other political activists. The Commonwealth of Nations, which had pleaded for clemency, suspended Nigeria's membership in response. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU all implemented sanctions, but not on petroleum (Nigeria's main export).
Shell claimed it asked the Nigerian government to show clemency towards those found guilty,[12] but its request was refused. However, a 2001 Greenpeace report found that "two witnesses that accused them [Saro-Wiwa and the other activists] later admitted that Shell and the military had bribed them with promises of money and jobs at Shell. Shell admitted having given money to the Nigerian military, who brutally tried to silence the voices which claimed justice".[13]
As of 2006, the situation in Ogoniland has eased significantly, assisted by the transition to democratic rule in 1999. However, no attempts have been made by the government or any international body to bring about justice by investigating and prosecuting those involved in the violence and property destruction that have occurred in Ogoniland,[14] although individual plaintiffs have brought a class action lawsuit against Shell by in the US.[15]
Ijaw unrest (1998–1999)
The December 1998 All Ijaw Youths Conference crystallized the Ijaws' struggle for petroleum resource control with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. In it, long-held Ijaw concerns about the loss of control over their homeland and their own lives to the oil companies were joined with a commitment to direct action. In the declaration, and in a letter to the companies, the Ijaws called for oil companies to suspend operations and withdraw from Ijaw territory. The IYC pledged "to struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice," and prepared a campaign of celebration, prayer, and direct action, Operation Climate Change, beginning December 28.In December 1998, two warships and 10-15,000 Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states as the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) mobilized for Operation Climate Change. Soldiers entering the Bayelsa state capital of Yenagoa announced they had come to attack the youths trying to stop the oil companies. On the morning of December 30, two thousand young people processed through Yenagoa, dressed in black, singing and dancing. Soldiers opened fire with rifles, machine guns, and tear gas, killing at least three protesters and arresting twenty-five more. After a march demanding the release of those detained was turned back by soldiers, three more protesters were shot dead including Nwashuku Okeri and Ghadafi Ezeifile. The military declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa state, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and banned meetings. At military roadblocks, local residents were severely beaten or detained. At night, soldiers invaded private homes, terrorizing residents with beatings and women and girls with rape.
On January 4, 1999 about one hundred soldiers from the military base at Chevron’s Escravos facility attacked Opia and Ikiyan, two Ijaw communities in Delta State. Bright Pablogba, the traditional leader of Ikiyan, who came to the river to negotiate with the soldiers, was shot along with a seven-year-old girl and possibly dozens of others. Of the approximately 1,000 people living in the two villages, four people were found dead and sixty-two were still missing months after the attack. The same soldiers set the villages ablaze, destroyed canoes and fishing equipment, killed livestock, and destroyed churches and religious shrines.
Nonetheless, Operation Climate Change continued, and disrupted Nigerian oil supplies through much of 1999 by turning off valves through Ijaw territory. In the context of high conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian Federal Government (and its police and army), the military carried out the Odi massacre, killing scores if not hundreds of Ijaws.
Subsequent actions by Ijaws against the oil industry included both renewed efforts at nonviolent action and attacks on oil installations and foreign oil workers.[16]
Creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (2000-2003)
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 by President Olusegun Obasanjo with the sole mandate of developing the petroleum-rich Niger-Delta region of southern Nigeria. Since its inauguration, the NDDC has focused on the development of social and physical infrastructures, ecological/environmental remediation and human development. The NDDC was created largely as a response to the demands of the population of the Niger Delta, a populous area inhabited by a diversity of minority ethnic groups. During the 1990s these ethnic groups, most notably the Ijaw and the Ogoni established organisations to confront the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies such as Shell. The minorities of the Niger Delta have continued to agitate and articulate demands for greater autonomy and control of the area's petroleum resources.Timeline
Emergence of armed groups in Niger Delta (2003–2004)
The ethnic unrest and conflicts of the late 1990s (such as those between the Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekiri), coupled with a peak in the availability of small arms and other weapons, led increasingly to the militarization of the Delta. By this time, local and state officials had offered financial support to those paramilitary groups they believed would attempt to enforce their own political agenda. Conflagrations have been concentrated primarily in Delta and Rivers States.[17]Prior to 2003, the epicenter of regional violence was Warri.[17] However, after the violent convergence of the largest military groups in the region, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom (both of which are primarily made up of Ijaws), conflict became focused on Port Harcourt and outlying towns. The two groups dwarf a plethora of smaller militias, supposedly numbering more than one hundred. The Nigerian government classifies these groups as "cults", many of which began as local university fraternities. The groups have adopted names largely based on Western culture, some of which include Icelanders, Greenlanders, KKK, and Vultures. All of the groups are constituted mostly by disaffected young men from Warri, Port Harcourt, and their sub-urban areas. Although the smaller groups are autonomous from within, they have formed alliances with and are largely controlled from above by either Asari and his NDPDF or Tom's NDV, who provide military support and instruction.
The NDPVF was founded by Asari, a former president of the Ijaw Youth Council, in 2003 after he "retreated into the bush" to form the group with the explicit goal of acquiring control of regional petroleum resources. The NDPFV attempted to control such resources primarily through oil "bunkering", a process in which an oil pipeline is tapped and the oil extracted onto a barge. Oil corporations and the Nigerian state point out that bunkering is illegal; militants justify bunkering, saying they are being exploited and have not received adequate profits from the profitable but ecologically destructive oil industry. Bunkered oil can be sold for profit, usually to destinations in West Africa, but also abroad. Bunkering is a fairly common practice in the Delta but in this case the militia groups are the primary perpetrators.[18]
The intense confrontation between the NDPVF and NDV seems to have been brought about by Asari’s political falling out with the NDPVF’s financial supporter Peter Odili, governor of Rivers State following the April 2003 local and state elections. After Asari publicly criticized the election process as fraudulent, the Odili government withdrew its financial support from the NDPVF and began to support Tom’s NDV, effectively launching a paramilitary campaign against the NDPVF.
Subsequent violence occurred chiefly in riverine villages southeast and southwest of Port Harcourt, with the two groups fighting for control of bunkering routes. The conflagrations spurred violent acts against the local population, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread displacement. Daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activity to shut down, widespread property destruction resulted.
The state campaign against the NDPVF emboldened Asari who began publicly articulating populist, anti-government views and attempted to frame the conflict in terms of pan-Ijaw nationalism and "self-determination." Consequently, the state government escalated the campaign against him by bringing in police, army, and navy forces that began occupying Port Harcourt in June 2004.
The government forces collaborated with the NDV during the summer, and were seen protecting NDV militiamen from attacks by the NDPVF. The state forces failed to protect the civilian population from the violence and actually increased the destruction of citizens' livelihood. The Nigerian state forces were widely reported to have used the conflict as an excuse to raid homes, claiming that innocent civilians were cahoots with the NDPVF. Government soldiers and police obtained and destroyed civilian property by force. The NDPVF also accused the military of conducting air bombing campaigns against several villages, effectively reducing them to rubble, because they were believed to be housing NDPVF soldiers. The military denies this, claiming they engaged in aerial warfare only once in a genuine effort to wipe out an NDPVF stronghold.
Innocent civilians were also killed by NDPVF forces firing indiscriminately in order to engage their opponents. At the end of August 2004 there were several particularly brutal battles over the Port Harcourt waterfront; some residential slums were completely destroyed after the NDPVF deliberately burned down buildings. By September 2004, the situation was rapidly approaching a violent climax which caught the attention of the international community.[18]
Nigerian oil crisis (2004-2006)
After launching a mission to wipe out NDPVF, approved by President Olusegun Obasanjo in early September 2004, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari declared "all-out war" with the Nigerian state as well as the oil corporations and threatened to disrupt oil production activities through attacks on wells and pipelines.[19] This quickly caused a major crisis the following day on September 26, as Shell evacuated 235 non-essential personnel from two oil fields, cutting oil production by 30,000 barrels per day (4,800 m3/d).Nigeria was the world's tenth largest oil exporter. The abundant oil reserves resulted in widespread exploitation. The Niger Delta region encompasses about 8% of Nigeria’s landmass and is the largest wetlands region on the African continent. Oil drilling in the region began in the 1950s. In the beginning, the oil drilling in the region really stimulated Nigeria’s economy and was extremely beneficial to the country. Numerous multinational corporations established oil operations in the region and made a conscious effort to not violate any environmental or human rights regulations. Shell began drilling in the Niger Delta region in 1956. Over time, Shell’s presence in Nigeria has been very detrimental.[20] These negative consequence are the result of thousands of oil spills, human rights violations, environmental destruction, and corruption. Over the past half century, Nigeria has become a plutocracy; political power is concentrated solely in the hands of the socioeconomic elite. Shell’s strong presence has played a major role in the absence of democracy in Nigeria. According to the documentary Poison Fire,[21] one and a half million tons of oil have been discharged into the Delta's farms, forests, and rivers since oil drilling began in 1956. This is equivalent to 50 Exxon Valdez disasters. Hundreds of kilometers of rain forest have been destroyed by the oil spills. When petroleum is discharged into the soil, the soil becomes acidic, which disrupts photosynthesis and kills trees because their roots are not able to get oxygen. Moreover, the fish population has also been negatively affected by oil drilling. The region is home to over 250 different fish species, and 20 of these species are found nowhere else in the world.[22] If oil spills continue at this rate entire species will become extinct and the entire Nigerian fishing industry will be decimated.
Royal Dutch Shell controversy
Platform London, Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) and Amnesty International have launched international campaigns aimed at having Shell clean the oil spills in the Delta. The organisations are concerned about the economic and health consequences for the people in the region. Shell's inability to respond effectively has led Friends of the Earth Netherlands and Amnesty International to believe it actively contributes to the human rights violations in the region. Because of the large area affected, the environmental consequences are vast.[23]Piracy and kidnapping (2006–2014)
Main article: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Starting in October 2012 Nigeria
experienced a large spike in piracy off its coast. By early 2013 Nigeria became the second most-pirated nation in
Africa, after Somalia. The Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta is thought to be behind most of the attacks.[24]
Since October 2012 MEND has hijacked 12 ships, kidnapped 33 sailors, and killed
4 oil workers. Since this started the United
States has sent soldiers to train Nigerian soldiers in maritime tactics
against pirates. Since this 33 pirates have been captured. Although the Nigerian
Navy now has learned new tactics to use against pirates, attacks still
occur on an almost regular basis.
Main article: Foreign hostages in Nigeria
Since 2006, militant groups in Nigeria's Niger
Delta, especially the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have resorted to taking foreign
employees of oil companies hostage. More
than 200 foreigners have been kidnapped since 2006, though most were released
unharmed.[25]Military crackdown (2008–2009)
In August 2008, the Nigerian government launched a massive military crackdown on militants. They patrolled waters and hunted for militants, searched all civilian boats for weapons, and raided numerous militant hideouts.[26]On May 15, 2009, a military operation undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) began against MEND militants operating in the Niger Delta region.[27] It came in response to the kidnapping of Nigerian soldiers and foreign sailors in the Delta region.[28] Thousands of Nigerians have fled their villages and hundreds of people may be dead because of the offensive.[29]
Presidential amnesty program (2009-2016)
Pipeline attacks had become common during the insurgency in the Niger Delta, but ended after the government on June 26, 2009 announced that it would grant amnesty and an unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta which would last for 60 days beginning on 6 August 2009 and ending 4 October 2009. Former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua signed the amnesty after consultation with the National Council Of State. During the 60-day period, armed youths were required to surrender their weapons to the government in return for training and rehabilitation by the government.[30] The program has been continued into the present.[31][32] Militants led their groups to surrender weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades, guns, explosives, and ammunition. Even gunboats have been surrendered to the government. Over 30,000 purported members signed up between October 2009 and May 2011 in exchange for monthly payments and in some cases lucrative contracts for guarding the pipelines. Though the programme has been extended through this year, the new government of Muhammadu Buhari sees it as a potentially enabling corruption and so feels that cannot be continued indefinitely.[33] The amnesty office has worked to reintegrate the fighters into society, primarily by placing and sponsoring them in vocational and higher education courses in Nigeria and abroad.[34]The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) program proved to be a success, with violence and kidnappings decreasing sharply. Petroleum production and exports have increased from about 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in mid-2009 to between 2.2 and 2.4 million bpd since 2011.[34] However, the program is costly and chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution that which fueled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed. With Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan’s defeat in the March 2015 elections, the amnesty program seems likely to end in December 2015 and with patronage to former militant leaders terminated, local discontent is deepening.[34]
2016-present conflict
Main article: 2016 Niger Delta conflict
A February 2016 explosion in a pipeline operated by Shell Petroleum
Development Corporation, a Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary to the Shell Forcados
export terminal halted both production and imports. Speculation centered on
militants using divers. Emmanuel Ibe Kachikwu, minister of state for
petroleum and the head of Nigeria’s
oil company, said Nigerian production was down 300,000 barrels a day as a
result.[33]
On May 11 Shell closed its Bonny oil facility. Three soldiers guarding the
installation were killed in an attack, said Col.
Isa Ado of the
Joint Military Force.[35]
A bomb had closed Chevron's Escravos facility a week earlier.[35]
On May 19 ExxonMobil's
Qua Iboe closed and evacuated its workers due to militant threats.[36]The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), a militant group in the Niger Delta, publicly announced its existence in March 2016.[37] The NDA have attacked oil-producing facilities in the delta, causing the shutdown of oil terminals and a fall in Nigeria's oil production to its lowest level in twenty years.[37] The attacks caused Nigeria to fall behind Angola as Africa's largest oil producer.[38] The reduced oil output has hampered the Nigerian economy and destroyed its budget,[39] since Nigeria depends on the oil industry for nearly all its government revenue.[40]
In late August 2016, NDA declared a ceasefire and agreed for negotiations with the Nigerian government.[41][42] After declaration of ceasefire by Niger Delta Avengers, Reformed Egbesu Fraternities comprising the three militants groups Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta, Egbesu Red Water Lions and Egbesu Mightier Fraternity; announced a 60-day ceasefire.[43]
On 9 August 2016, Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate declared its existence and threatened to destroy refineries in Port Harcourt and Warri within 48 hours as well as a gas plant in Otu Jeremi within a few days.[44] The next day, the group reportedly blew up a major oil pipeline operated by the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) in Isoko.[45] On 12 August, the group warned that it will blow up more oil installations in the future.[46] On 19 August, the group was reported to have blown up two pipelines belonging to NPDC in the Delta State.[47] On 30 August, the group blew up the Ogor-Oteri oil pipeline in the state.[48] On 4 September, the group claimed it had rigged all the marked oil and gas facilities with explosives and warned residents living near them to evacuate[49]
Reference
· "BBC News -
Nigerian militants seize workers from oil rig". Bbc.co.uk. 2010-11-09. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
·
· Koos, Carlo; Pierskalla, Jan
(2015-01-20). "The
Effects of Oil Production and Ethnic Representation on Violent Conflict in
Nigeria: A Mixed-Methods Approach". Terrorism and Political Violence. 0
(0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.962021.
ISSN 0954-6553.
·
· Where Vultures Feast
(Okonta and Douglas, 2001)
·
· The Price of Oil: Corporate
Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing
Communities (Human Rights Watch, 1999)
·
· Haller, Tobias; et al. (2000). Fossile
Ressourcen, Erdölkonzerne und indigene Völker. Giessen: Focus Verlag. p. 105.
·
· "Bogumil
Terminski, Oil-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human
Rights Issue" (PDF).
Conflictrecovery.org. Retrieved 14 October 2014.
·
· Mathiason, Nick (2009-04-05). "Shell
in court over alleged role in Nigeria executions | Business | The
Observer". London:
Guardian. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
·
· Nick Mathiason (April 4, 2009). "Shell
in court over alleged role in Nigeria executions". Guardian.
·
· "Contamination
in Paulina by Aldrin, Dieldrin, Endrin and other toxic chemicals produced and
disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil" (PDF). Greenpeace. 2001. Retrieved 14
October 2014.
·
· "THE NIGER
DELTA: NO DEMOCRATIC DIVIDEND" (PDF). Human Rights Watch. 2002. Retrieved 14
October 2014.
·
· Antoni Pigrau (November 2013). "The
environmental and social impact of Shell's operations in Nigeria". Per
la Pau / Peace
in Progress. International Catalan Institute for Peace. ISSN 2013-5777.
·
· "World
Wildlife Fund. 2006. Fishing on the Niger River. Retrieved May 10, 2007". Retrieved 13
June 2016.
·
· Philp, Catherine (January 19, 2009). "British
hostages moved by Niger rebels after botched rescue". The Times. London. Retrieved May
2, 2010.
·
· Fatade, Wale (2009-05-28). "Niger
Delta offensive intensifies". 234next.com. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
·
· Walker, Andrew (2009-05-27). "Africa | Will
Nigeria oil offensive backfire?". BBC News. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
·
· "IRIN Africa |
NIGERIA: Thousands flee violence, hundreds suspected dead | Nigeria | Conflict
| Economy | Environment". Irinnews.org. 2009-05-22. Retrieved 2011-04-23.
·
· "Why
Buhari Will Sustain Amnesty Programme – Presidency - INFORMATION NIGERIA". Retrieved 13
June 2016.
·
· Maggie Fick in Lagos;
Anjli Raval in London
(March 8, 2016). "Bombed
pipeline to hit Nigeria oil output". Financial Times.
·
· "Curbing
Violence in Nigeria (III): Revisiting the Niger Delta". Crisis Group.
29 September 2015.
·
· Hilary Uguru; Michelle Faul (May 11,
2016). "Shell
Nigeria shuts oil terminal as attacks cut production". Seattle Times. AP.
·
· Jarrett Renshaw; Libby George; Simon
Falush (May 19, 2016). "Nigeria's
Qua Iboe crude oil terminal closed, workers evacuated - traders".
Reuters.
·
· "Nigeria arrests
'Avengers' oil militants". BBC News Online. 16 May 2016. Retrieved 16
May 2016.
·
· Elena Holodny (16 May 2016). "Africa's
largest oil producer has been dethroned". Business Insider. Retrieved 16
May 2016.
·
· "The
Niger Delta Avengers: Danegeld in the Delta". The
Economist. 25 June 2016.
Retrieved 25 June 2016.
·
· "Avengers
unite! Violence in the Delta has cut oil output by a third. It may get even
worse". The Economist. 25 June 2016. Retrieved 25
June 2016.
·
· "Rebels
in Niger Delta cease attacks on oil platforms, agree to peace talks".
Deutsche Welle. 21 August 2016.
Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "Rebels
in Niger Delta cease attacks on oil platforms, agree to peace talks".
Pulse.ng. 21 August 2016. Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "N'Delta
Militants: More Groups Declare Ceasefire". Reports Afrique News. 22
August 2016. Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "Niger
Delta: Another militant group emerges, vows to bring down refineries in Port
Harcourt, Warri within 48 hours". Daily Post. 9 August 2016. Retrieved 7
September 2016.
·
· "New
Niger Delta militant group, Greenland blows up oil pipeline in Delta".
Daily Post. 10 August 2016.
Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "Niger
Delta militants issue another deadly warning". News24. 12 August 2016. Retrieved 7
September 2016.
·
· "Suspected
Niger Delta militants blow up two NPDC pipelines in Delta". Daily
Post. 19 August 2016. Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "JUST
IN: Militants strike again, blow up NPDC facility". Naij. 30 August
2016. Retrieved 7 September 2016.
·
· "Militants
tell residents to vacate oil facilities Read more:
https://www.naij.com/955371-militants-set-to-bomb-more-oil-facilities-as-it-prepare-to-attack-army.html".
Naij. 4 September 2016. Retrieved 7 September 2016. line feed
character in
|title= at position 50 (help); External link in |title= (help)
51.
· "PROPHESY:
Buhari Will Be Distracted In 2017 But Pray For Him - Ogedengbe". Blank
NEWS Online.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)